@inproceedings{May2022,
title = {Legendre PRF (Multiple) Key Attacks and the Power of Preprocessing},
author = {Alexander May and Floyd Zweydinger},
url = {https://iblockchain-projekt.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/2021-645.pdf
https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/645
https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/CSF2022/index.html},
year = {2022},
date = {2022-08-01},
booktitle = {35th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium},
pages = {11},
publisher = {IEEE},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}

@inproceedings{cryptoeprint:2021:1652,
title = {Financially Backed Covert Security},
author = {Sebastian Faust and Carmit Hazay and David Kretzler and Benjamin Schlosser},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1652.pdf},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-12-16},
booktitle = {Public-Key Cryptography - (PKC) 2022 - 25th {IACR} International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public Key Cryptography, Virtual Event,
May 07-11, 2021, Proceedings},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}

@inproceedings{Das2021,
title = {The Exact Security of BIP32 Wallets},
author = {Poulami Das and Andreas Erwig and Sebastian Faust and Julian Loss and Siavash Riahi
},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-15},
booktitle = {CCS ’21- Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
publisher = {ACM},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}

@inproceedings{Döttling2021,
title = {On the Impossibility of Purely Algebraic Signatures},
author = {Nico Döttling and Dominik Hartmann and Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz and Sven Schäge and Bogdan Ursu},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/738},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-11-08},
booktitle = {Theory of Cryptography (TCC 2021)},
publisher = {Springer International Publishing},
abstract = {The existence of one-way functions implies secure digital signatures, but not public-key encryption (at least in a black-box setting). Somewhat surprisingly, though, efficient public-key encryption schemes appear to be much easier to construct from concrete algebraic assumptions (such as the factoring of Diffie-Hellman-like assumptions) than efficient digital signature schemes. In this work, we provide one reason for this apparent difficulty to construct efficient signature schemes.

Specifically, we prove that a wide range of algebraic signature schemes (in which verification essentially checks a number of linear equations over a group) fall to conceptually surprisingly simple linear algebra attacks. In fact, we prove that in an algebraic signature scheme, sufficiently many signatures can be linearly combined to a signature of a fresh message. We present attacks both in known-order and hidden-order groups (although in hidden-order settings, we have to restrict our definition of algebraic signatures a little). More explicitly, we show: - the insecurity of all signature schemes in Maurer's generic group model (in pairing-free groups), as long as the signature schemes do not rely on other cryptographic assumptions, such as hash functions. - the insecurity of a natural class of signatures in hidden-order groups, where verification consists of linear equations over group elements.

We believe that this highlights the crucial role of public verifiability in digital signature schemes. Namely, while public-key encryption schemes do not require any publicly verifiable structure on ciphertexts, it is exactly this structure on signatures that invites attacks like ours and makes it hard to construct efficient signatures. },
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}

@inproceedings{Abera2021,
title = {GrandDetAuto: Detecting Malicious Nodes in Large-Scale Autonomous Networks},
author = {Abera, Tigist and Brasser, Ferdinand and Gunn, Lachlan and Jauernig, Patrick and Koisser, David and Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-10-06},
booktitle = {24th International Symposium on Research in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses (RAID 2021)},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}